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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890121-CA 
v. : 
GREGORY J. MARSHALL, : Category No. 10 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence entered on March 6, 1989 
in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, 
State of Utah. On April 4, 1989, this Court granted defendant's 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Is the trial court's factual finding that a valid 
safety reason existed for the stop of defendant's vehicle clearly 
erroneous? 
2. Is the trial court's factual finding that defendant 
could be briefly detained for identification of the driver, 
registration of the vehicle and issuance of a warning citation 
clearly erroneous? 
3. Is the trial court's factual finding that the 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle 
clearly erroneous? 
4. Did the trial court err in reaching the legal 
conclusion that the stop and subsequent search of defendant's 
vehicle were constitutionally valid? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and constitutional provisions 
for a determination of this case are: 
1. Amendment IV, United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized, 
2. Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982): 
Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect - Grounds. A peace officer 
may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
_«* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit, 145 pounds of 
marijuana, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8 (Supp. 1989) (R. 2). In a pretrial motion, defendant 
moved to suppress the marijuana (R. 23-4). An evidentiary 
hearing was held before the Honorable Donald V. Tibbs, Judge, 
Sixth Judicial District, State of Utah (R.39). Subsequent to the 
hearing, both parties submitted memorandum to the trial court (R. 
56-87, 32-37, 41-8). On February 15, 1989, defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized was denied (R. 54-5, Findings and 
Order Denying Motion to Suppress). Defendant then sought and was 
granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal (R. 91, 187). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 25, 1988, at approximately 9:15 a.m., Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery was on routine patrol on S.R. 
70 near Salina, Sevier County, Utah (T-l. 4; T-2. 3, 5). As 
Trooper Avery was turning over the median to continue his patrol, 
The following statement of facts relies on the transcript of 
defendant's preliminary hearing held on July 19, 1988 in this 
matter (R. 16-18) and incorporated by reference in defendant's 
motion to suppress in the lower court (R.56); the transcript of 
the deposition of Trooper Denis Avery held on October 14, 1988 in 
connection with forfeiture proceedings in this matter and 
incorporated and published in defendant's motion to suppress in 
the lower court (R. 56; T.46-7); and, the transcript of the 
evidentiary hearing in the trial court on defendant's motion to 
suppress (T-l). Consistent with the indexing on appeal, the 
preliminary hearing transcript will be referred to as (T-2. page 
number), the deposition transcript as (D-l. page number) and the 
suppression hearing transcript as (T-l. page number). Further, 
since the testimony in all three hearings was substantially 
consistent, reference will only be made to the testimony during 
the motion to suppress (T-l) except as otherwise appropriate. 
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he noticed defendant's vehicle in the left hand lane passing a 
motor home (T-l. 4# 8; T-2. 7-8). Defendant's vehicle was not 
speeding nor passing improperly and the trooper did not pursue 
the vehicle (T-2. 7). However, after the trooper completed his 
turn and proceeded behind the vehicle/ the trooper could observe 
that the turn signal of defendant's vehicle had remained blinking 
(T-2. 8) For approximately two more miles defendant failed to 
cancel his signal light (T-2. 9). Not knowing whether there was 
a mechanical problem or whether defendant had negligently left 
the turn signal on, the trooper pulled the vehicle over to inform 
defendant of the problem and issue a warning ticket (T-l. 8, 9; 
D-l. 15, 20). Trooper Avery had followed this same procedure in 
observing other vehicles having a continuous turn signal (D-l. 
16; T-2. 13). 
Prior to stopping defendant, Trooper Avery had noticed 
that the vehicle had California license plates (T-l. 10). He did 
not see how many individuals were in the vehicle nor did he 
notice anything about any particular individual (D-l. 23, 24). 
He had no opinion about the race of any occupant of the vehicle 
prior to the stop; and, is not of the belief that the race of a 
defendant is relevant to any determination of involvement in 
criminal activity (D-l. 23, 31). In fact, defendant in this case 
is a fair skinned Caucasian (D-l. 22). The trooper did not call 
his dispatcher to tell her that he was pulling the car over nor 
did he request any backup assistance (D-l. 17). He did not 
because his only intention in stopping defendant was to inform 
defendant of the equipment problem and issue a warning citation 
(T-l. 8, 19; D-l. 15,20). 
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Consistent with this purpose, Trooper Avery approached 
defendant while defendant was in his vehicle (T-l. 12). When the 
trooper informed defendant of the signal light problem, defendant 
responded that he had been having "a hard time keeping that thing 
turned off" (T-l. 12; D-l. 17). The trooper asked defendant to 
identify himself and provide his driver's license and vehicle 
registration (T-2. 12). Defendant supplied the trooper with a 
New York license and a California rental agreement for the 
vehicle (T-2. 12; D-l. Deposition Exhibit 1, Incident Report). 
Defendant stated that he was going to Colorado to ski and would 
be returning the vehicle to San Diego, California (T-l. 15). 
This was inconsistent with the rental contract which indicated 
that the car was to be returned to New York within four days (T-
1. 15). 
Defendant and Trooper Avery went to the trooper's car 
so that the trooper could issue the warning citation for the turn 
signal (T-l. 17). After issuing the citation, the trooper 
returned to defendant his driver's license, rental agreement and 
the warning citation (T-l. 21). 
The trooper asked defendant if he could look inside the 
vehicle (T-l. 5, 22; T-2. 18). Defendant responded "Go ahead" 
(T-l. 5, 22; T-2. 18). Trooper Avery and defendant walked back 
to defendant's vehicle. The passenger door was locked but 
defendant reached in on the driver's side and opened the door (T-
1. 24-5). A small red bag was on the floor of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery asked if he could open it and defendant agreed (T-
1. 25). No contraband was found in the interior of the car (T-l. 
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25-6). Trooper Avery then asked if defendant had the key to the 
trunk and if defendant would open the trunk (T-l. 27;D-1. 55). 
Defendant got the key and began opening the trunk. At this 
point, defendant started shaking so badly that the trooper had to 
hold up the latch cover so defendant could insert the key (T-l. 
31; T-2. 20). Trooper Avery's practice is to always have the 
driver open the trunk, MJust so that, you know, if he has any 
objections, he's right there. I don't have the keys. He's got 
the keys himself. He's free to go — there's no coercion factor" 
(T-2. 56). 
Upon opening the trunk, four padlocked suitcases were 
visible. The trooper asked defendant what was in the cases, 
defendant responded "clothes" (T-l. 28). Trooper Avery asked if 
he could look inside the bags and defendant immediately responded 
that the suitcases were not his and must have already been in the 
vehicle when he rented it (T-l. 28; D-l. 57). After unzipping 
one bag a few inches and determining that it contained marijuana, 
the trooper seized the suitcases and arrested defendant for 
felony possession of marijuana (T-l. 28, 30). 
Defendant did not testify nor present any evidence in 
contradiction of the trooper's testimony in the court below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A defendant has the burden of establishing ownership in 
any property seized for purposes of standing to challenge a 
search and seizure. Here, defendant abandoned any claim of 
ownership in the property at the time of his arrest and further 
failed to assert any interest in the property in the court below. 
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As such, this Court should sua sponte determine that defendant 
lacks standing. 
Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's 
challenge, review must be limited to a determination of whether 
the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous and 
whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusions based on 
those factual findings. Here, the evidence as a whole amply 
supports the trial court's factual findings that defendant's 
vehicle was validly stopped and that defendant voluntarily 
consented to a search of the interior and trunk areas of the 
vehicle. Further, the trial court properly applied appropriate 
law in concluding no constitutional rights of defendant's were 
violated such that the evidence should be suppressed. 
Even if this Court assumed for purposes of analysis 
that the stop of the vehicle is invalid as pretextual, 
defendant's voluntary consent to the search purges the seizure 
from any taint of illegality. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEIZURE OF THE FOUR SUITCASES. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress the four suitcases containing marijuana seized 
from the trunk of the vehicle rented by defendant. However, 
based on defendant's consistent denial of ownership of the 
suitcases, defendant lacks standing to challenge the seizure. 
Respondent acknowledges that at the time of the search 
defendant had a possessory interest in the vehicle pursuant to 
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the valid rental agreement; and, thus, standing to object 
generally to the search of the vehicle. The limited issue for 
purposes of this case is not standing to object to the place of 
the search but standing to object as to the property seized. 
Here, defendant has disclaimed any possessory interest or 
ownership of the suitcases both during the search and subsequent 
to his arrest. Of equal importance, defendant did not testify 
nor otherwise assert a possessory interest in the suitcases 
during the hearings below. In fact, defendant's position has 
consistently been the suitcases were left in the vehicle by 
another renter; he has claimed no knowledge of their existence in 
the trunk nor of their contents (T-l. 28; T-2. 20; D-l. 57 and 
Deposition Exhibit 1, Incident Report). Under such 
circumstances, defendant should be viewed as having abandoned any 
privacy interest through his disclaimer of ownership. United 
States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1981), modified on other 
grounds, 674 F.2d 1217, cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); United 
States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Williams, 538 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1976). 
In Utah, the federal standard governing standing as 
found in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh. denied, 423 
U.S. 1122 (1979), has been adopted. State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 
1334 (Utah 1984). A defendant only has standing to object to a 
search or seizure of evidence when he can establish that he had 
"a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place," Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143. Constitutional prohibitions 
against unlawful search and seizure are personal and do not 
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extent to the search of another's premises or property. Id. at 
133. While a defendant "who owns or lawfully possesses or 
controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy" in the property; Jd. at 144, n.12; a 
defendant who asserts neither a property nor a possessory 
interest in the property seized has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy and therefore lacks standing. Id. at 148. Further, 
"[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of 
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
by the challenged search or seizure," Ld. at 131, n.l. 
Consistentlyf the Utah Appellant Courts have 
interpreted Rakas as denying standing where the defendant claimed 
no ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle searched nor 
the property seized. State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334; State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 
194 (Utah App. 1987). While these cases considered both the lack 
of interest in the place searched as well as the property seized, 
the Utah Supreme Court has found it equally "specious" for a 
defendant to disclaim any interest in an item seized and yet 
later attack the seizure as a violation of the defendant's 
constitutional rights. State v. Meyers, 21 Utah 2d 110, 441 P.2d 
510, 511 (1968). 
Other jurisdictions have applied the same reasoning in 
determining that a criminal defendant can have no standing to 
object to the search or seizure of property the defendant has 
voluntarily abandoned. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 
240-41 (1960) reh'q. denied, 363 U.S. 984 (1960); State v. 
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Mahone, 67 Haw. 644, 701 P.2d 171, 175 (1985); Menefee v. State, 
640 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Okl. Cr. 1982); and State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 
245, 255-56 (Alaska 1980). There can be no privacy interest to 
protect in abandoned property. State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 
857 (Utah 1978). 
In determining if property has been abandoned, the 
question is one of intent. Did defendant through words, acts or 
other objective facts evidence an intent to abandon any interest 
in the property? State v. Mahone, 701 P.2d at 175. A verbal 
disclaimer of ownership can constitute an abandonment of fourth 
amendment protections. United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 
(9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); United States 
v. Miller 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 
958 (1979); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that 
defendant initially denied ownership of the suitcases at the time 
of their discovery. As the trooper testified: 
Subsequently, when I opened the trunk I asked 
him what was in the bag. He told me clothes. 
Immediately he reversed his thing and told me 
it must have been in the trunk when he rented 
the vehicle. 
(T-l. 28). Defendant expanded upon his disclaimer after his 
arrest while being transported to the jail when he told the 
trooper: 
[Defendant] was standing in line at the 
rental agency and they had checked his credit 
and credit cards and they told him that even 
if he paid cash, they wouldn't rent him a 
vehicle. A man standing behind [defendant] 
spoke up and said that he would rent the 
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vehicle for [him] if [defendant] would pay 
for it. 
(D-l. Deposition Exhibit 1, Incident Report, Paragraph 26). 
This is not a situation such as in State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 511, n.5 (Utah App. 1989) where this Court determined 
that a single disclaimer of ownership asserted at the scene in 
response to police questioning was insufficient to deny defendant 
standing. Rather, here defendant has consistently asserted a 
temporary possessory interest in the rented vehicle while 
preserving his argument that others had access to the vehicle 
prior to his possession such that the contraband must be theirs 
and not his. He is attempting to turn his transitory interest in 
the place searched into a defense to the crime charged; yet, at 
the same time, argue he has a constitutional interest in the 
property seized. It is this inconsistent bootstrapping which the 
United States and Utah Supreme Courts rejected in adopting the 
expectation of privacy test of Rakas v. Illinois over the 
automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 
(1960), overruled, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
Have failed in the lower court to establish any "claimed right of 
possession" in the four suitcases, defendant lacks standing to 
object their seizure. State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d at 127. 
Finally, respondent acknowledges the Utah Supreme 
Court's recent conclusion that "standing to challenge the 
validity of a search under the Fourth Amendment is not 
jurisdictional" and therefore may be waived if only raised for 
the first time on appeal. State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 
38, 41 (Utah 1989). However, as noted by Justice Howe with the 
concurrence of Chief Justice Hall, the Utah Appellate Courts have 
consistently recognized that "[s]tanding is an issue that a court 
can raise sua sponte at any time", IdL , at 43, J. Howe, 
dissenting. In accord, State v. Tuttle, 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 
(1989). Under the facts of this case where defendant's failure 
to establish any possessory interest in the property seized is 
obvious from the record, respondent would urge this Court to 
consider sua sponte the issue of standing to avoid plain error. 
State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 39 (1989); State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
POINT II 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SHOULD BE 
LIMITED TO INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS. 
Defendant argues through out his appellate brief that 
this Court should construe both state constitutional protections 
and state statutory procedures as offering greater protection to 
a criminal defendant than those protections afforded by the 
fourth amendment of the federal constitution. The Utah Supreme 
Court has noted: 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the 
fourth amendment, and thus this Court has 
never drawn any distinctions between the 
protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court 
has always considered the protections 
afforded to be one and the same. 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted). In accord, State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 n.2 
(Utah App. 1989). 
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Additionally, this Court has ruled that "nominally 
alluding" to any asserted differences in federal and state 
constitutional guarantees in the trial court does not 
sufficiently raise the issue for purposes of appellate review. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. Rather, "motions to suppress 
should be supported by precise averments, not conclusionary 
allegations," Id. at 328. Thus, an appellate court will not 
consider particular grounds for suppressing evidence unless those 
same grounds were argued at the lower court level. Id. 
Here, defendant did not argue for any separate state 
analysis at the trial court level. In oral argument at the 
suppression hearing, reference was only made to federal 
constitutional standards (T-l. 32-36). Similarly, in his 
memorandums submitted to the trial court, defendant only 
nominally alluded to state constitutional provisions without 
analysis (R.56-87, 41-48). Therefore, defendant's present 
argument for a stricter state standard should not be considered 
by this Court. Points 1(B), 11(C) and III(A) of Appellant's 
brief should be disregarded. All constitutional applications 
should be limited to federal constitutional standards. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS VALIDLY STOPPED. 
Defendant makes a wide ranging attack on the trial 
court's factual determination that the vehicle driven by 
defendant was properly stopped "based on the Officer's perceived 
vehicle safety problems of a broken turn signal or driver's 
negligenceM (R.54, Finding 1 of Order Denying Motion to 
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Suppress). However, defendant's argument is basically twofold: 
first, that an officer may only stop a vehicle for traffic 
violations as opposed to observed unsafe vehicle conditions; and, 
second, that the officer in this case only stopped defendant's 
vehicle as a pretext to a search. Neither argument is supported 
by the factual findings of the lower court nor the legal 
conclusions of the appellate courts. 
Basic to the fallacy of defendant's arguments is 
defendant's disregard for the applicable standard in reviewing 
trial court rulings on motions to suppress. As stated by this 
Court: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989). Further, 
The trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence or if [the appellate 
court] reach[s] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. 
State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah App. 1988). 
This Court must sustain the trial court's factual 
findings unless those findings are against the clear weight of 
the evidence or otherwise clearly erroneous; but, may, as 
appropriate, review for error the lower court's legal conclusions 
based on the factual findings. State v> Johnson, 771 P.2d at 
327. 
As previously noted, the trial court factually 
concluded the stop of defendant's vehicle was constitutionally 
.1 A -
valid as "based on the Officer's perceived vehicle safety 
problems of a broken turn signal or driver's negligence" (R.54, 
Finding 1 of Order Denying motion to Suppress). This 
determination was supported by the following facts: 
1. While on routine patrol, Trooper Avery observed 
defendant's vehicle pass a motorhome on the highway (T-l. 4). 
2. While continuing on routine patrol, Trooper Avery 
observed the turn signal on defendant's vehicle fail to turn off 
and to continue blinking (T-2. 8). 
3. The turn signal remained on for two more miles (T-
2. 9). 
4. The trooper decided to pull defendant's vehicle 
over because of the suspected mechanical failure of the signal to 
turn off (T-l. 8, 9). 
5. In pulling the defendant over, the trooper decided 
to inform the driver of the problem and issue a warning citation 
(T-l. 8, 9). 
6. After the defendant stopped his vehicle, the 
trooper approached defendant as the driver of the vehicle and 
informed him of the turn signal problem. Defendant acknowledged 
the equipment failure by stating that he had been having problems 
with the signal turning off (T-l. 12). 
7. The trooper issued a warning notice to defendant 
marking the violation as for Mlights, head, tail or other" (D-l. 
13; Deposition Exhibit 2# Warning Notice). 
8. The trooper has previously stopped vehicles for 
similar problems with signal lights and given warning notices (D-
1. 16; T-2. 13). 
Despite these facts, defendant speciously argues that 
the trooper was mistaken in believing that a failed turn signal 
is a traffic violation and therefore the trooper had no right to 
stop defendant's vehicle (Br. of Appellant, at 14). Defendant 
cites to various provisions of Title 41, the traffic code, and 
the Rules and Regulations and Instructions for Official Vehicle 
Inspection Stations to contend that a vehicle traveling on the 
highways of Utah need not be affixed with properly working turn 
signals. Such is not the case. As seen by defendant's own 
citations, Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-121.10 (1988) requires all 
vehicles manufactured after 1953 to be equipped with electric 
turn signals. Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-117 (1988) requires all 
vehicles on the highway to have "lamps or other equipment in 
proper condition or adjustment." Further, if a car is being 
inspected and a signal light fails to automatically cancel the 
driver is to be advised. Section V, Rules and Regulations and 
Instructions for Official Vehicle Inspection Stations. The 
evidence did establish that defendant was driving a 1988 Plymouth 
four-door on S.R.70 in Sevier County, Utah (D-l. Deposition 
Exhibit 2, Warning Notice) as such the trial court was fully 
entitled to take judicial notice that defendant's vehicle was 
required to be in working condition. 
Further, defendant argues that unless the state proved 
a specific traffic violation was involved, the trooper could not 
stop defendant's vehicle. In support, defendant cites State v. 
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988). In doing so, defendant 
mi8construe8 this Court'8 decision and disregards fundamental 
caselaw governing stops of vehicles. 
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In Baird, the officer passed the defendant's vehicle 
and without any supportable facts determined that "something just 
truck me funny about it," 763 P.2d at 1215. Based on this hunch, 
the officer deliberately followed the defendant's vehicle and 
stopped it to see if its safety sticker was valid. After the 
vehicle was stopped but before questioning defendant, the officer 
was able to see that the sticker was valid. Despite this, the 
officer continued to detain defendant. Relying on Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873 (1975), this Court restated and applied the accepted 
standard that an officer must have reasonable, articulable 
suspicions that a person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime prior to stopping that person's vehicle and detaining the 
individual. State v. Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216. This has been the 
universal standard for state and federal courts and is codified 
in Utah law in Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) which states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
In Baird, as well as subsequent cases, this Court has 
concluded that whenever the police stop an automobile, the stop 
"necessarily involves detention and therefore is [an] encounter 
requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion," State v. Holmes, 
774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989), quoting State v, Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214, 1216. While reasonableness must be based on 
objectivety, there is no "bright line delineating what is or is 
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not reasonable," Id. at 508. 
The fallacy of defendant's argument is that Delaware v. 
Prouse does not stand for the proposition that an officer may 
only stop a vehicle for observable traffic violations and not 
observable safety problems. Just the opposite. The United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that an officer is 
duty bound in the "vital interest of highway safety" to stop 
vehicles for a variety of safety reasons which may or may not be 
actual traffic code violations for: 
Many violations of minimum vehicle safety 
requirements are observable and something can 
be done about them by the observing officer, 
directly and immediately. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660-661. While rejecting random 
stop checks, the Court concluded that an officer may stop a 
vehicle for a "multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations", if observed, and detain the person while 
determining the driver's identification, vehicle registration and 
a determination of the appropriateness of a citation. Such stops 
are justified in light of the State's interest in having only 
qualified drivers and safely equipped vehicles on its road. To 
this end: 
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to 
pervasive and continuing governmental 
Respondent concedes that the initial stop of defendant's 
vehicle constituted a level two detention. State v. Johnson, 717 
P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 
1987). Because defendant consented contemporaneously with the 
termination of this detention, it is not critical to this case to 
determine if a level two detention may subsequently revert to a 
level one detention through the conduct of the officer; in other 
words, would a level two detention terminate with the issuance of 
a citaiton and return of a defendant's documents? 
regulation and controls, including periodic 
inspection and licensing requirements. As an 
everyday occurrence, police stop and examine 
vehicles when license plates or inspection 
stickers have expired, or if other 
violations, such as exhaust fumes or 
excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights 
or other safety equipment are not in proper 
working order. 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976), quoted with 
approval in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). 
Once stopped, an officer may inquire as to information 
about the driver and vehicle "reasonably related in scope to the 
justification" for the detention, United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 
(1968). Defendant notes correctly that the United States 
Supreme Court has declined to establish a per se rule governing 
the length of duration acceptable for an investigatory stop (Br. 
of Appellant at 26). But, the Court has more than declined. It 
has ruled that to establish such a bright line would be 
inappropriate as "common sense and ordinary human experience must 
govern over rigid criteria," United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 685 (1984). For, 
While it is clear that "the brevity of the 
invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests is an important factor in 
determining whether the seizure is so 
minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on 
reasonable suspicion, . . . we have 
emphasized the need to consider the law 
enforcement purposes to be served by the stop 
as well as the time reasonably needed to 
effectuate those purposes. 
Id. at 685. Thus,the brief delay necessitated by the issuance of 
a traffic citation is not only minimumally instructive, but 
proper and inevitable. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 
+ r\ 
(1983). So too, is the usual police protective procedure of 
removing the driver from the vehicle while issuing a citation. 
3 
Pennsylvannia v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The trial court 
was, therefore, justified in finding that the investigation was 
reasonable in duration and scope based on the circumstances of 
confronted by Trooper Avery (R. 54, Findings 2 and 3, Order 
Denying Motion to Suppress). 
The second prong of defendant's argument is that the 
officer's stop of the vehicle was pretextual to his search and 
therefore invalid. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988). Defendant correctly argues that in determining when a 
stop is pretextual this Court has adopted the objective standard 
of whether a reasonable officer would have stopped defendant's 
vehicle as opposed to the question of merely could the officer 
stop the vehicle. Id. at 978, applying the reasoning of United 
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). There must be an 
"objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on 
the officer's actual state of mind," State v. Sierra, at 977. 
This assessment must be made in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, l^d- i ancl ^6 n o t invalidated merely because the 
officer's subjective motives may have been improper. United 
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to allow 
an officer, without consent, to open the trunk area of a stopped 
vehicle with faulty brake lights as being incident to an on-site 
vehicle inspection. United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 
(1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981). 
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Here, the trial court rejected defendant's argument 
that the stop was pretextual. In making this factual assessment, 
the lower court considered the general validity of the stop as 
previously discussed and the additional facts that: 
1. The trooper was on routine patrol at the time of 
observing defendant's vehicle and did not deviate from that route 
to intentionally follow defendant (T-l. 3, 7). 
2. The trooper did not radio dispatch for additional 
assistance in anticipation of a search or arrest prior to the 
stop (D-1. 17). 
3. The only evidence presented in the lower court as 
to the reason for the stop was the trooper's testimony in which 
he said that his only criteria in stopping the vehicle was the 
observable safety violation (T-l. 8, 9). 
4. In the six months prior to the stop of defendant, 
the trooper had issued approximately five to ten warning 
citations specifically for failure to turn off a turn signal. In 
none of those cases, did the trooper search the vehicles (D-1. 
16; T-2. 13). 
5. For the sixty days prior to the stop of defendant 
and for the thirty days after, the trooper had issued 
approximately 175 traffic violations and an additional 175 
warning citations. In hypothetically, only one out of fifty of 
those cases did the trooper search the stopped vehicles (D-1. 54, 
62). 
6. Prior to stopping the vehicle, the trooper made no 
determination as to the occupants of defendant's vehicle, neither 
the number, sex, nor race, and did not consider these factors in 
stopping the vehicle (D-l. 23-31). 
7. Prior to stopping the vehicle, the trooper was able 
to observe that the vehicle had out-of-state license plates but 
did not consider that information in stopping the vehicle (T-l. 
10). 
8. In stopping a vehicle, the trooper "looks at each 
car the same" (D-l. 29-30). 
Other than counsel's assertion that the stop was 
pretextual, defendant presented no evidence to contradict the 
testimony of the trooper. 
Based on the testimony, the trial court had ample 
support for its factual finding that the stop was valid (R.54, 
Finding 1, Order Denying Motion to Suppress). Based on the law, 
the trial court properly concluded, the "Officer had a right to 
give a warning ticket and to obtain information on the driver and 
ownership of the vehicle," (R. 54, Finding 2, Order Denying 
Motion to Suppress). Further, the scope of any inquiry was 
reasonable (R.54; Finding 3, Order Denying Motion to Suppress). 
There is no basis from which to conclude that the trial court's 
rulings was clearly erroneous. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH 
OF THE INTERIOR AND TRUNK AREA OF THE 
VEHICLE. 
As previously discussed, a trial court's factual 
findings are entitled to due deference by this Court unless those 
findings are found to be clearly erroneous in light of the entire 
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record. State v. Bruce, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1989). This 
standard has otherwise been stated as: 
The appellate court . . . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere 
fact that on the same evidence the appellate 
court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) quoting, Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2585 (1971). 
Determinations as to consent are considered factual. United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1979). 
In determining whether a defendant's consent to a 
search was voluntarily given, the Utah appellate courts adhere to 
the "totality of circumstances" standard as set forth in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In making this 
evaluation, courts may consider the absence of any claim of 
authority such as a search warrant by the officer, the absence of 
any exhibition of force by the officer, if the defendant 
responded to a request to search, the cooperation by the 
defendant and the absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980). Other factors relating to the the age, intelligence and 
education of the defendant may be considered. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218. While the court must look to all the 
factual circumstances surrounding the giving of the consent, the 
courts do not require nor advocate any set formula for obtaining 
the consent. Ici. In this regard, there is no legal requirement 
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that the consent must be in written form to be valid nor that a 
defendant be informed of his right to refuse consent. IdL at 
227; State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106. However, the 
burden of proving that the consent was voluntarily given is on 
the State. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); State 
v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, May 
15, 1989. 
On facts almost identical to those at bar, the United 
States Supreme Court determined in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that 
the defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of both the 
interior and trunk of his vehicle. An officer on routine patrol 
observed the defendant's vehicle with one headlight and the 
license plate light burned out. He stopped the vehicle and in 
the course of the detention asked if he could search the vehicle. 
The defendant said "Sure, go ahead". After searching the 
interior, the officer asked "Does the trunk open?". The 
defendant got the keys and opened the trunk. Overturning the 
lower court's suppression of the evidence, the Supreme Court 
justified the consent as voluntary under the totality of the 
circumstances. 
Applying this same test to the present facts, the 
record clearly indicates that defendant voluntarily consented to 
the search of the vehicle he was driving (R. 54, Finding 4, Order 
Denying Motion to Suppress). As discussed in Point III, 
defendant had been validly stopped on the highway because his 
turn signal was continuing to blink. Defendant acknowledged the 
problem when stopped. The trooper then asked defendant for his 
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driver's license and vehicle registration. Defendant gave the 
trooper his license and the rental agreement for the vehicle. 
Upon request, defendant accompanied the trooper to the trooper's 
vehicle so that a warning ticket could be issued. All of these 
actions were as anyone would expect after being stopped for an 
equipment problem, the existence of which is not questioned. 
Prior to the citation being issued, the trooper and 
defendant conversed (T-l. 16, 31). The conversation was not 
unusual for such a situation. Defendant told the trooper that he 
had rented the car to ski in Colorado and would be returning it 
to California (T-l. 15). This statement did not coincide with 
the information on the rental agreement which was that the car 
was to be returned within four days to New York, the place of 
defendant's residence (T-l. 15; D-l. Deposition Exhibit 2, 
Warning Notice). At the same time, the trooper observed that 
defendant had certain characteristics and items in the car 
consistent with a drug courier (T-l. 13-14; D-l. 22-36). Based 
on his training and experience, the trooper became suspicious. 
Despite this, the trooper did not accuse defendant of any crime, 
radio for additional officers or otherwise suggest to defendant 
that the trooper suspected him of transporting narcotics. 
Instead, the trooper gave back to defendant his driver's license, 
rental agreement and warning citation (T-l. 21). While the 
trooper did not affirmatively inform defendant he was free to go, 
the act of returning the license, rental agreement and citation 
would, under the circumstances, have put a reasonable person on 
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notice that the detention had terminated. This holds especially 
true where, as here, the warning notice had plainly printed on 
it: 
This is not a summons to appear in Court. It 
is a friendly contact by the highway patrol 
regarding improper driving or the mechanical 
condition of your vehicle. The highway 
patrol requests your cooperation in 
decreasing the number of motor vehicle 
accidents on the highways of our state by 
obeying all traffic regulations and 
maintaining your vehicle in safe mechanical 
condition. 
(T-l. 17; D-l. Deposition Exhibit 2, Warning Notice). 
Having concluded that he would ask for consent to 
search the vehicle, Trooper Avery asked if defendant's vehicle 
contained weapons, alcohol or drugs and then requested if he 
could look inside the vehicle. Defendant responded "Go ahead" 
(T-l. 5, 22; T-2. 18). 
The trooper and defendant proceeded to the vehicle, the 
passenger door was locked and defendant, without further request, 
reached in and unlocked the door (T-l. 24-25). The trooper 
searched the interior of the vehicle, located certain items but 
not the contraband in question (T-l. 25-26). 
Certainly, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
evidence fully justifies the trial court's factual finding that 
the defendant consented to the search. Even counsel for 
appellant conceded as much in the trial court by agreeing 
Because "the scope of the fourth amendment protection does not 
vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being 
approached**, a reasonable person standard must be applied in 
judging when a detained individual is free to go, Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988). In accord, United States v. 
Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1979). 
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defendant consented to the search of the interior of the vehicle 
(R.34-35). Counsel's argument to the trial court was that when 
defendant agreed to the search, he subjectively thought the 
trooper would just do a plain view search of the interior and not 
the trunk of the vehicle. Based on defendant's position in the 
lower court, he should be precluded on appeal from a claim that 
the search of the interior of the car was not voluntarily 
consented to by defendant. State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 328. 
The search of the trunk of defendant's vehicle occurred 
subsequent to the search of the interior. Immediately upon 
completing the search of the interior, the trooper asked 
defendant if he had the key to the trunk of the vehicle and if 
the trooper could look inside it (T-l. 27; D-l. 55). Defendant 
responded by getting the key and trying to open the trunk. 
Defendant began shaking so violently as he attempted to open the 
trunk that Trooper Avery had to hold the latch cover up while 
defendant inserted the key (T-l. 31; T-2. 20). Upon opening the 
trunk, the four suitcases were immediately visible (T-l. 28). 
Trooper Avery allowed defendant to open the trunk as opposed to 
handing the key to the trooper so that the trooper could be fully 
aware if defendant had any objections (T-2. 56). Here, defendant 
neither by word nor action ever protested the search of the 
trunk. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, there is 
ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that no 
coercion or duress was placed on defendant to consent to the 
search (R. 54, Finding 4, Order Denying Motion to Suppress). 
When the trooper asked defendant if he would open the trunk, 
defendant was not in custody nor otherwise unreasonably detained. 
The trooper did not claim any authority to search nor deceive 
defendant into thinking he had a warrant or right to search the 
trunk. In fact, just the opposite. The trooper had just 
finished searching the interior of the vehicle pursuant to 
defendant's voluntary consent. While searching the inside, the 
trooper had found a red bag. Despite the trooper's legal right 
to search the bag, the trooper had asked defendant's permission 
to do so. Defendant had consented. After this second request 
and obtaining of consent, the trooper asked defendant if he had 
the key and could look inside the trunk. Clearly, during each 
step of the search, the trooper asked and defendant agreed to 
continue the search. By asking permission in this manner, the 
trooper clearly conveyed to defendant that his authority to 
search did not extend to those areas of the vehicle to which 
defendant did not consent. The record is completely devoid of 
any evidence of threatening or overbearing actions on the part of 
the trooper as claimed by defendant in his brief. 
Despite this evidence, defendant argues that the State 
failed to establish the consent was voluntary because only 
generalized questions were asked on direct examination, i.e., the 
details of the stop and subsequent search were brought out in 
cross-examination. Defendant's point could have some validity if 
after the direct examination of the trooper during the motion to 
suppress, the State had rested and no further cross-examination 
or other evidence had been presented. Instead, the State merely 
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asked the trooper relevant but generalized information on direct 
and then turned the witness over for cross-examination. 
Additionally, the transcript of the preliminary hearing as well 
as the transcript of the trooper's deposition in the forfeiture 
proceedings were incorporated and admitted for the court's 
consideration. Thus, this Court as well as the lower court is 
not only entitled but mandated to look to the record as a whole 
in determining the factual issues in question. 
POINT V 
EVEN IF THE STOP WAS DETERMINED TO BE 
PRETEXTUAL, DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
PURGES THE TAINT OF ANY PRIOR ILLEGALITY. 
Even if this Court were to simply assume for purposes 
of analysis that the stop of defendant's vehicle was pretextual 
or otherwise invalid, the seizure would still be permissible as 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the interior and 
trunk of the vehicle. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, granted, May 15, 1989; State v. Aguilar, 758 P.2d 
457 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988). As stated by this Court, the appropriate inquiry is: 
[WJhether, granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which 
instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint. 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155. Noting that the United States 
Supreme Court has rejected the Mbut for" type of analysis now 
advocated by defendant, this Court continued: 
Thus, even though this evidence would not 
have been discovered "but for" the prior 
illegal stop, the evidence is not per se 
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inadmissible. . . . Moreover, a search 
conducted pursuant to voluntary consent 
purges the taint from the prior illegality. 
:id. at 155. 
Defendant would have this Court focus away from the 
objective voluntariness of defendant's consents to the subjective 
motives of the trooper. Defendant argues that a trooper must 
have reasonable suspicion that a defendant is committing a crime 
prior to seeking a consent to search. Such an argument is 
without factual or legal merit. 
As discussed in Point III, an officer must have 
reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and question its 
occupants. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. Where a officer observes a 
traffic violation or safety problem, he may stop the vehicle. 
Consistent with such a stop, the officer may issue a traffic or 
warning citation. A detention which occurs for this purpose is 
justified by the initial purpose of the stop. If during the 
course of such a stop, the officer requests and the defendant 
agrees to a search of the vehicle, there is no additional 
requirement of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222. 
Yet, defendant attempts to divert this Court by arguing 
that if the officer has a hunch or relies on a drug courier 
profile as his reason for seeking consent to search, that the 
5 
consent is somehow diminished. The United States Supreme Court 
Defendant confuses the insufficiency of objective facts with 
their impermissibly. The courts have universally concluded that 
all types of factors, including what might otherwise be 
considered wholly innocent conduct, may be considered by an 
officer. United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581. However, 
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has recently responded to such a claim in determining if an 
officer's basis for reasonable suspicion to detain a person is 
invalid due to the officer's reliance on profile characteristics. 
United States v. Sokolow# 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). The Court 
concluded that while reliance on a drug courier profile might 
render an insufficient basis on which to stop and question an 
individual, a profile is not a per se invalid basis for 
establishing reasonable suspicion.
 <Id. at 1587. For, 
A court sitting to determine the existence of 
reasonable suspicion must require an agent to 
articulate the factors leading to that 
conclusion, but the fact that these factors 
may be set forth in a "profile" does not 
somehow detract from their evidentiary 
significance as seen by a trained agent. 
Id. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
very test which defendant claims this Court accepted in State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Defendant advocates a 
reviewing court evaluate each factor relied on by the officer 
individually, requiring each to individually establish a 
reasonable suspicion rather than the totality of the factors (Br. 
of Appellant, at 24.) It was this same approach by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 
1413 (9th Cir. 1987) cited by defendant which was rejected and 
overruled. The United States Supreme Court held that such a rule 
in determining the reasonableness of a stop or detention would 
"create unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the 
relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment," 
Cont. those factors may in an individual case be insufficient. 
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972 (Utah App. 1988). 
United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586. Instead/ the Court 
applied a "common sense" approach to look to all the factors, 
innocent and otherwise, to determine if taken collectively they 
established a reasonable basis for the detention. 
Equally, unsupportable is defendant's argument that the 
trooper was required to use the physically least instructive 
methods in informing defendant of the mechanical problem such as 
merely announcing over his loud speaker that the turn signal was 
on (Br. of Appellant, at 19). Such gymnastics have again been 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court as misapplying the 
holding of Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
The Court in Florida v. Royer stated that "the 
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's 
suspicion in a short period of time," Iji. at 500. In United 
States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587, the Court clarified the 
statement as referring to: 
the length of the investigative stop, not at 
whether the police had a less intrusive means 
to verify their suspicions before stopping 
Royer. The reasonableness of the officer's 
decision to stop a suspect does not turn on 
the availability of less intrusive 
investigatory techniques. 
Indeed, even the Court in Florida v. Royer noted that the 
evidence would not have been suppressed if the consent had been 
obtained at the point of detention as opposed to in a separate 
police detention room to which the defendant had unreasonably 
been removed. Florida v. Royer at 505. 
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Finally, defendant asks this Court to follow United 
States v, Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985), in evaluating 
this case. Respondent concurs for Recalde, as do United States 
v. Gonalaz, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985) and United States v. 
Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986) cited by defendant, all turn 
on the fact that the defendants had been significantly detained, 
at times removed to a police station, while the defendant's 
license and registration had not been returned. Clearly, under 
such facts, the State had to establish a reasonable basis for the 
continued detention of the defendants; and, failing to do so, the 
evidence was suppressed. More recently, in United States v. 
Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied 108 S. Ct. 
2820 (1988), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
defendant's consent was valid despite the fact that the search of 
the vehicle occurred at a police station while defendant was 
clearly being detained. Noting that United States v. Gonzalez 
and United States v. Recalde were "limited to their facts", the 
Court went on to evaluate the circumstances "as they appeared to 
these prudent, cautious and trained police officers". 
This Court need not make a separate determination as to 
reasonableness beyond the initial detention. If defendant was 
validly stopped for a traffic problem, his limited initial 
detention for purposes of identification, registration and the 
See for comparsion, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
555, where defendant's personal identification and plane tickets 
were returned to her prior to voluntarily consenting; and, 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, where consent would have been 
voluntary if given prior to the unreasonable detention despite 
the agents retaining the defendant's identification and tickets. 
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issuance of a citation was reasonable. If at the end of that 
detention, with his license, rental agreement and citation 
returned, defendant voluntarily consented to a search, there is 
no additional issue of reasonableness to review. Even if this 
Court wishes for purposes of analysis to assume that the stop was 
pretextual, there is still no basis of reasonableness to 
determine as long as defendant voluntarily consented. The fact 
that the trooper may have compared defendant to profile 
characteristics or had suspicions as to defendant's activities 
prior to seeking consent is totally irrelevant to the validity of 
the consent. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153; State v. Aguilar, 
758 P.2d 457; State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully 
submits that the order of the trial court denying defendant's 
motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this //y*h day of September, 
1989. 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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